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Choice Architecture for Healthier Insurance Choices: Ordering and
Partitioning Can Improve Decisions

Abstract
Health insurance decisions are a challenge for many consumers and influence welfare, health
outcomes, and longevity. Two choice architecture tools are examined that can improve these
decisions: informed ordering of options (from best to worst) and choice set partitioning. It is
hypothesized that these tools can improve choices by changing: (1) decision focus: the options in
a set on which consumers focus their attention, and (2) decision strategy: how consumers
integrate the different attributes that make up the options. The first experiment focuses on the
mediating role of the hypothesized decision processes on consumer decision outcomes. The
outcome results are validated further in a field study of over 40,000 consumers making actual
health insurance choices and in two additional experiments. The results show that informed
ordering and partitioning can reduce consumers’ mistakes by hundreds of dollars per year. They
suggest that wise choice architecture interventions depend upon two factors: The quality of the
user model possessed by the firm to predict consumers’ best choice and possible interactions
among the ensemble of choice architecture tools.

Keywords
Choice architecture, decision-making, consumer decision process, health insurance choice,
consumer welfare
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Choice architecture is a potentially powerful way for firms to affect the market behavior
of consumers. In this paper, we illustrate these effects in a personally and societally important
choice, the selection of health insurance coverage. There is evidence that access to health
insurance increases longevity (Woolhandler and Himmelstein 2017). Health insurance decisions
are important for consumers because they determine access to potentially lifesaving health care
and have important financial consequences. They are important for society because health care
coverage is an important contributor to firms’ costs and to social justice. Finally, as we shall see,
what seem to be minor changes in choice architecture can have a large effect on health insurance
product market share and consumer welfare.
Ideally, choice architecture can be used to direct consumers’ choices toward better
outcomes (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). For example, defaults can be used to facilitate the choice
of a good alternative without requiring an extensive contemplation (Johnson and Goldstein
2003). Much research to date has focused on describing the impact of different separate choice
architecture tools on consumer choices outcomes (Cadario and Chandon 2018; Johnson et al.
2012; Lamberton and Diehl 2013; Szaszi et al. 2018).
Our goals in this paper are two-fold. Our first goal is to contribute to the understanding
of choice architecture. We do this in two ways: One is by exploring the process by which choice
architecture changes consumer decision outcomes. We specifically propose and test two types of
choice architecture–induced changes in consumer decision processes that affect consumer
decision outcomes. The second way is by demonstrating that the quality of the firm’s prediction
of what is the best choice, what we will call a user model, is an essential component of designing
choice architecture.
Our second goal is to demonstrate how a new combination of choice architecture
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interventions can improve health insurance choices. Health insurance choices are highly
complex: People often do not understand the basic terms, such as deductibles, used to describe
insurance (Loewenstein et al. 2013; Ubel, Comerford, and Johnson 2015), and make mistakes
that result in substantial overpayment for coverage (Johnson et al. 2013). A recent examination
of the choices of a large firm showed that the majority of decision-makers picked options that
were dominated, and employees paid 42% more ($373 annually) than needed for equivalent
coverage (Bhargava, Loewenstein, and Sydnor 2017), essentially wasting a large part of their
payments. Improving these choices could both make the allocation of health care resources more
efficient for society and improve health outcomes for individuals.
At first blush, improving choices seems close to the idea that marketing should fulfill
consumer needs. However, good choice architecture could also lead to the sale of less profitable
products. This may be incongruent with the idea that marketing actions should increase profits
or shareholder value. Yet, with the rapid advances in large-scale data availability and digital
technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, there may be a new reality:
Marketers are often be able to predict with great accuracy which products best match a given
consumer’s needs (Chintagunta, Hanssens, and Hauser 2016) and perhaps they may know better,
or as least as well, as a consumer. Therefore, new data-analytics driven services could
potentially be designed that use choice architecture to increase the probability consumers will
choose the product that is best for them, and at the same time may provide new business
opportunities for firms. Domains such as health, consumer finance, and education, are especially
promising for such interventions, because they involve high-impact consumer decisions, where
the complexity of the decision makes it difficult for consumers to select the best available option
by themselves. We return to how this may affect firm market shares and consumer welfare, in
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the short and long term at the end of this paper.

Choice Architecture Processes: Decision Focus and Decision Strategy
To intelligently choose and implement choice architecture interventions, marketers need
to understand how the intervention affects consumers’ decision making. There has been
significant research examining the way that preselecting options, or default effects work (Carroll
et al. 2009; Dinner et al. 2011; Jachimowicz et al. 2017). The robustness of default effects may
be due to multiple causes, including the ease of selecting the default, the implied endorsement of
the default, and the fact that the default option might be seen as an endowed option (Brown and
Krishna 2004). However, there are many other elements of choice architecture, such as ordering,
partitioning, deciding the size of a choice set, and the labeling of attributes that have seen less
exploration of the mechanisms that determine their effectiveness.
We concentrate on two decision process mechanisms that apply across several different
interventions but seem particularly relevant to the choice architecture interventions we examine:
partitioning the choice set and ordering the choice set by predicted quality. The first mechanism
is that choice architecture can change the options examined by consumers. Decision-makers
allocate attention differentially across options, and choice architecture can change this allocation
to shift attention towards the highest quality options. We term this mechanism decision focus.
Imagine, for example, that a consumer inspects only the first five options, even when the total set
of products is much larger. If the choice architect changes the order presented to the consumer,
this will change the alternatives the consumer considers and, perhaps, the alternative chosen.
The second mechanism is that choice architecture can change the way consumers process the
attributes that describe the options. We term this consumers’ decision strategy. One well-known
5
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taxonomy used to describe strategies differentiates between compensatory and noncompensatory heuristics (Gilbride and Allenby 2004; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993).
Roughly speaking, compensatory strategies are more effortful, and make tradeoffs between
attributes, while non-compensatory strategies are simpler, because they do not directly make
tradeoffs. Although there are cases where non-compensatory strategies produce good choices,
non-compensatory strategies can perform badly if here is a negative correlation between the
attributes of the options (Bettman et al. 1993). This occurs frequently, for example because of
physical and financial constraints. Insurance policies with low premiums must have higher
deductibles to be viable, and gasoline vehicles with great acceleration tend to have worse fuel
economy. More generally, markets in which all products are on the efficient frontier will be
constrained to have some negatively correlated attributes (Johnson and Payne, 1985). As a
result, choice architecture that encourages non-compensatory strategies can, in some cases,
produce worse choices. To discuss how these two decision processes may be influenced by
choice architecture, we turn to our two common interventions, often used in practice, but that
have received less academic attention, partitioning and ordering.

Partitioning Effects on Decision Focus and Strategy
Partitioning (Cheema and Soman 2008; Dorn, Messner, and Wänke 2016; Johnson et al.
2012) separates a choice set into two or more sets that can be inspected sequentially. Many web
sites present a “soft” partitioning that allows consumers to easily click through from a first,
smaller selection to the another, larger selection of options. For example, an airline site might
first present a small subset of all possible flights. Doing this draws decision makers’ attention to
the initially presented products (which we call the primary set), but at the same time allows them
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the option to click through to see the remainder of the set (i.e., the full set). Through
partitioning, the initial inspection for the first presented set of alternatives is less costly (in terms
of effort) to the consumer than inspection of the full set (which requires one or more additional
information requests, such as a mouse click).
Normatively, given that the additional costs (one mouse click) of accessing the full set
are negligible, inspection of the full set might have a positive return for the consumer and,
therefore, consumers should typically continue to inspect this set after inspecting the primary set.
In contrast, we predict that decision makers are myopic and that the perceptually more
prominent, higher cost of having to click through to the next screen will dominate the potential
returns to search in consumers’ decisions to inspect the full set or not (Häubl, Dellaert, and
Donkers 2010; Hogarth and Einhorn 1992; Wilson et al. 2000). This suggests that partitioning
will increase consumers’ focus on the smaller restricted set of alternatives.
Evidence also suggests that this reduction may affect the consumer’s decision strategy.
Typically, when faced with a large choice set, consumers make first make a less detailed
evaluation of the larger set of alternatives followed by a more in-depth comparison takes for a
small subset of products (Chakravarti, Janiszewski, and Ülkümen 2006; Payne 1976). While
compensatory strategies may not be cognitively feasible in a making a decision for the full set
(Besedeš et al. 2015; Chernev, Böckenholt, and Goodman 2015; Dellaert and Häubl 2012;
Hanoch et al. 2011), presenting a smaller primary set will increase the probability of consumers
using a compensatory decision strategy, promoting tradeoffs between different attributes
(Johnson and Meyer 1984; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). In contrast, when choice sets
are large, heuristics such as screening will cause consumers to focus on one attribute, which
increases its weight and lowers decision quality.

7
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Ordering Effects on Decision Focus and Strategy
The second intervention we examine involves ordering the options. If options presented
early in a choice set have an advantage in being chosen, then populating these positions with
alternatives most likely to be good for the consumer may improve choice. The basic idea is that
order effects should be used to the consumers’ advantage.
There is a large and complex literature that examines the effect of option order which has
a complex set of results. In some studies, people demonstrate edge avoidance and concentrate on
options occupying the center of the visual field (Atalay, Bodur, and Rasolofoarison 2012), but in
many other studies there seems to be an advantage of being first, with some usually smaller
advantage of being last (Bar-Hillel 2015). One way of reconciling this discrepancy is to suggest
that it is not order, per se, that produces order effects, but rather attention is the key factor in
mediating the advantage of order. For example, Atalay et al. (2012) find that attention mediates
the effect of order and other studies which control order by serial presentation of stimuli show
strong advantages of being first (Mantonakis, et al. 2009; Russo, Carlson, and Meloy, 2006).
Other applications that show strong advantages of choices from ordered lists include an increase
in the downloads of working papers by economists (Feenberg et al. 2017) and the vote share of
political candidates (Koppell and Steen 2004; Miller and Krosnick 1998), although in the case of
voting there are moderating variables (Ho and Imai 2008). Our concept of decision focus
captures the idea that increased attention can lead to significant advantages in choice. We argue,
therefore that for a list of options (as opposed to a matrix that features pictorial information), the
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first options will receive increased attention. 1
In contrast to the effect of focus, the effect of ordered lists on decision strategy is less
clear. Because ordering does not change the number and type of the options that are in the
choice set, and may even increase the complexity of comparing between options by bringing
more similar options closer together, we may not see a shift to compensatory strategies. In
addition, there is evidence that in some settings the effects of ordering by attractiveness is not
helpful to consumers (Diehl 2005). In this case, ironically, consumers search , too much. This
over-search can lead to worse choice outcomes, because it is more challenging for consumers to
select the best option from a larger set of options, which makes it more likely they choose a less
attractive one. In sum, we hypothesize that order could increase focus on desirable options, but
suspect that effects on strategy may be negligible or even negative.

User Models and Choice Architecture
The effectiveness of both partitioning and ordering depends strongly on how well the
choice architect can predict what is the best choice for the consumer. But given its importance, it
is surprising that the quality of this understanding, which we refer to as a user model, has not
received more explicit attention. For example, if the designer is naïve about what people need,
the subset provided by the partition might not contain better options, and the ordering could be
unrelated to choice quality. The accuracy of a user model will determine whether ordering is
helpful, has no effect, or even is potentially harmful.

1

We distinguish this from applications that sort options by a single attribute. Every choice set has an
order, even if it is random. Contrast this to applications that sort by price or quality (Lynch and Ariely
2000; Suk, Lee, and Lichtenstein 2012). That literature shows that sorting on an attribute increases the
importance of the attribute and leads individuals to eliminate based on that attribute. Sorting by predicted
quality, should increase, via reading order, of the choice of the first options.

9

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3418231

User models can differ in quality for at least two reasons: First, the marketer may not
know what is best for, or desired by, consumers. Some user models’ predictions are relatively
accurate and uncontroversial. For example, most people undersave for retirement, would like to
save more, and usually endorse the use of choice architecture tools such as defaults to increase
their savings (Madrian et al. 2017; Thaler and Benartzi 2004). Similarly, many individuals are
not very physically active, would like to exercise more, and support the use of choice
architecture to promote going to the gym more often (Milkman, Milson, and Volpp 2013). The
second reason why the user model might be inaccurate for any individual consumer is that
consumers needs and tastes might differ, and the firm may be unable to predict those differences.
Unobservable heterogeneity across consumers represent a challenge to choice architecture.
The quality of the user model will moderate the impact of most if not all choice
architecture interventions. User models can differ on several dimensions: They may be based on
normative models, use simple notions like ranking by market share, or use complex
recommender systems. But in all cases, user model quality is essential to implementing choice
architecture in the consumer’s best interest. Defaults, for example, presume that the firm knows
what is in the best interest of customers.
What should be done when user models are inaccurate? In these cases, strong choice
architecture might not improve the quality of choice or can even lead to a decrease in decision
quality. When user model quality is low, a choice architecture that supports greater consumer
autonomy could be more beneficial for consumers. Variability in the quality of user models
raises, therefore, an important question for choice architects: How to facilitate and improve
consumer choice while preserving consumer autonomy?
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Hypotheses
In sum, we propose two choice architecture tools that can, in principle, improve choice:
(1) partitioning large sets into two sets: a primary set of only a small number of alternatives and a
secondary set consisting of all the other alternatives, and (2) ordering options by a user model.
We argue that both of these interventions affect the decision focus of choosers and that
partitioning can affect consumer’s strategies in a positive manner. Finally, the quality of the user
model will determine if partitioning and ordering might help or hurt choice.
Both partitioning and ordering are relatively “soft” interventions: They do not remove
options from the choice set or marketplace, but we hypothesize that these (soft) restriction
improves consumer choice outcomes because they encourage consumers' decision focus to better
alternatives and change consumer strategies by encouraging a more compensatory decision
strategy that takes into account more of the relevant attributes.
Given that partitioning, ordering, and user models may individually and together affect
choice outcomes, we now turn to develop a set of hypotheses that capture these effects. Our
contribution is to show that both partitioning and ordering can aid choices, but only in the
presence of an accurate user model. Further, we show that these effects are due to shifts in
decision focus and strategy, even when the choice architecture interventions involve relatively
small and normatively irrelevant changes in the display.
H1: Partitioning affects decision strategy. Because partitioning reduces the number of
immediately visible options, we expect a shift to compensatory strategies.
H2: Informed ordering affects decision focus. The effects of ordering suggest that the
best options will receive more attention when an ordering benefits from a more accurate user
model. We term an ordering that uses a more accurate user model an informed ordering and
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predict that, compared to a naïve (i.e., more random) ordering, it will increase decision focus
because the best options are presented at the top of the list. However, because the number of
options remain unchanged and ordering promotes greater closeness of attractiveness we expect
little change in strategy.
H3: Partitioning affects decision focus, but only with informed ordering. Although the
remainder of options are only one click away and can contain the most favorable options, we
expect partitioning to cause individuals to focus attention on the smaller recommended set. This
focus contrasts with an analysis that suggests that search would be driven by the attractiveness of
the yet-to-be-inspected options. The relatively small additional cost will loom large in
allocations of attention. When ordering is informed (i.e., based on a high-quality user model),
this smaller recommended set supports decision focus on the best options. However, when
ordering is naïve, consumer attention will be focused on a random set of options, and decision
focus on the best options is likely to deteriorate.
H4: Partitioning improves choice with informed ordering but worsens choice with naïve
ordering. Because the smaller set in the partitioning is more likely to contain the better options,
the combination of an informed ordering with partitioning will improve choice. This
improvement is stronger than the sum of the separate impact that partitioning and ordering can
produce. In other words, partitioning and informed ordering interact to produce an even greater
improvement in choice. In contrast, partitioning combined with a naïve ordering can be harmful
to consumer choice. In our experiments, the naïve ordering is close to random, but we would
expect a greater decrease in choice quality if the user model generated a perverse ordering
whereby order was negatively correlated with what is best for consumers.
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H5: Changes in decision strategy and focus mediate this improvement. More precisely,
we predict that consumer choice outcomes will change due to shifts in the two consumer
decision processes and that these decision processes, in turn, are impacted by the choice
architecture interventions that are introduced. These effects represent a parallel mediation
process, as visualized in Figure 1. Thus, we hypothesize, first, that consumers’ use of
compensatory decision strategies mediates the effect of partitioning on consumer decision
outcomes, and second, that consumers’ focus on the best alternatives mediates the impact of an
informed ordering on consumer decision outcomes. Third, we also predict that the informed
ordering will moderate the effect of partitioning on consumer decision outcomes and that this
improvement will be mediated by consumers’ focus on the best alternatives (mediated
moderation). Figure 1 represents our hypotheses.
- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE –

Study 1: Consumer Health Insurance Choice with Ordered and Partitioned
Sets

In Study 1, we investigated the hypothesized effects of ordering and partitioning on
consumers’ choice outcomes and decision processes. We constructed a choice task modeled on a
typical consumer decision task on health insurance exchange websites that allow consumers to
purchase health insurance plans. The website was similar in many ways to HealthCare.gov and
the other health insurance exchange websites established under the Affordable Care Act in the
United States (Wong et al. 2016). We manipulated two components: (1) the quality of the user
model, based on which products were ordered in the set (low quality model for a naïve ordering
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versus a high quality model for an informed ordering), and (2) the absence or presence of
partitioning in the ordered set. Note that the quality of the user model was reflected in the
quality of the ordering. These two aspects work closely in tandem: user model quality is
presented to consumers through ordering.
The participants were given a defined goal representing the utility of another person and
asked to follow this clearly defined decision rule. The rule stated that their objective was to
minimize total expected costs given the person’s health care needs usage and the three provided
attributes. This eliminated unobserved preference heterogeneity between participants allowing
us to objectively define the quality of the decision that each participant made. We also
investigated how consumers’ decision processes change based on ordering, partitioning, and
their interaction. To do so, we used a MouselabWEB interface that allowed us to directly
observe which product attribute levels participants inspected during their decision process, and in
which order (see www.mouselabweb.org). This technique has been shown to be useful in the
study of individual choice, as well as games and time preferences (Costa-Gomes and Crawford
2006; Gabaix et al. 2006; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993; Willemsen and Johnson 2011).

Method
This study was a framed-field experiment (Harrison and List 2004) where actual
decision-makers made decisions with realistic stimuli. To increase the stakes, participants
received a monetary reward based on their performance in the task. More specifically, they
received $2 for participating and could earn an additional bonus of up to $6 dollars depending on
how well their choices matched the assigned goals. Participants were randomly assigned to one
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of four treatment conditions, based on a 2 (ordering: informed vs. naïve) by 2 (partitioning: yes
vs. no) between-subjects experimental design. All conditions presented the same eight health
insurance plans. The choice task was repeated once for each participant under the same
experimental condition, but with different attribute values. Under the informed ordering
condition, alternatives were ordered almost perfectly in order from best to worse (according to
the participants’ decision rule of minimizing expected costs). The only deviation was that the
first and third alternatives were switched. The naïve ordering condition presented a randomized
order of alternatives to participants with one exception, which was that the best alternative was
placed in the fourth ranked position. In the partitioned condition, respondents were shown the
first three recommended products, with the easily visible option of clicking through to the
complete list. The non-partitioned condition showed the complete ordered list of all the
recommended products directly to the participants (see Web Appendix A.1 for illustrations of the
two partitioning conditions).
Health insurance plans were described in terms of three key characteristics for the U.S.
market—the monthly premium, the doctor visit copayment, and the annual deductible. These
were also successfully used in earlier research in this domain and market (Bhargava et al. 2017;
Johnson et al. 2013). The plans reflected a realistic product set in the participants’ health
insurance market. The participants were also given the relevant health care usage of the person
for whom they were making the choice. This information allowed them to calculate the annual
expected costs of each of the health insurance products presented in the recommendation list.
To obtain deeper insight into the participants’ decision process while selecting an
alternative from the list, we implemented the experiment with a MouselabWEB online interface
(Willemsen and Johnson 2011). MouselabWEB allows researchers to trace the content and
15
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sequence of decision processes. The participants viewed a table in which each row represented a
different health plan and each column displayed a different plan attribute. This format
corresponded with the how recommendation lists are typically presented to participants on health
insurance exchange websites. In the MouselabWEB interface, participants used their mouse to
move the pointer on the screen across the different boxes in the table representing the different
attributes of each alternative. When the pointer hovers over a box, the level (value) of the
respective attribute is revealed, and when the pointer is moved, the information is hidden. This
process reveals how often, for how long, and in which order participants examined the
information about the attributes of each plan. Past research suggests a close correlation between
MouselabWEB observations and eye-tracking data, which can be an alternative way of tracing
participants’ decision processes (Lohse and Johnson 1996; Reisen, Hoffrage, and Mast 2008).
These data provide deep insight into the process behind the participants’ decision making. We
used the MouselabWEB data to investigate differences in participants’ decision processes
depending on whether or not they were presented with different combinations of ordering and
partitioning. These differences can reveal if the hypothesized shifts in decision making process
explain the effects of ordering and partitioning in improving consumer decision outcomes.
The participants were recruited through Amazon MTurk using US participants. We
predetermined the sample size to be 200 per treatment condition, almost twice that used in a
similar paradigm (Johnson et al. 2013). The assignment to treatment conditions was randomized
and the data collection was stopped after all the conditions contained at least 200 observations.
A total of 846 responses were obtained, and 18 outliers were eliminated because they had made
extraordinarily few (less than four) or many (more than 600) information acquisitions during the
choice process. The average age of the participants in the sample was 34.5 years old, 43.6%
16
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were female, and 50.3% had obtained a bachelor’s or higher degree.
The order of our description of the results maps into the hypotheses in Figure 1. We first
examine if the changes in choice architecture change the type of decision processing used by the
participants (H1 to H3). We then move to the right side of the figure to examine the effect of
choice architecture on the choices made by respondents (H4). We relate the two by testing for
mediated moderation of the decision process on choice outcomes (H5).

Results: Process Data
First, we studied the process-level data obtained from the MouselabWEB interface. This
interface allowed us to directly observe which product attribute levels participants inspected
during their decision process and in which order. We find strong effects of the interventions on
the decision processes, with partitioning changing decision strategy, and partitioning combined
with informed ordering producing an increase in decision focus.
We first present the data visually, in Figure 2, summarizing these data graphically in four
icon graphs (Willemsen and Johnson 2011), each representing one of the four experimental
conditions. The icon graphs summarize participants’ information acquisition processes. Each
box corresponds to one of the cells in the displays shown to respondents. For example, the top
left box in the upper left panel represents the monthly premium of Plan A in the non-partitioned,
naïve ordering condition. The length of the box represents the average time participants spent
inspecting a value (e.g., seven seconds) and the height represents the average number of times
participants acquired that value (e.g., three times). The length of the arrows between the boxes
represents the number of transitions participants made in their information acquisition process
(e.g., seven horizontal transitions from the monthly premium in plan A to the doctor visit copay
17
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also in plan A). The results are the means within each experimental condition for the two
repeated choice tasks. The inspection levels and large number of transitions show a significant
amount of interest by the participants, who on average took 92.6 seconds to make each choice.
Following standard practice, we eliminated all information acquisition observations of 200 ms or
less, because they were too short to be seen by the participants and probably reflect movements
of the pointer from one cell to the next (Willemsen and Johnson 2011).
- INSERT FIGURES 2, 3, AND 4 ABOUT HERE –
The figure clearly shows the effects of partitioning and ordering on the decision
processes, which can be observed by comparing the panels representing the different
experimental conditions. To conduct statistical tests of these effects, we constructed two process
variables corresponding to the hypothesized processes based on the inspection data. First,
decision strategy was measured using the Payne (1976) index measure. The Payne index (PI)
captures whether a participant’s information acquisition process is more alternative-based or
attribute-based. Alternative-based information acquisition reflects a compensatory decision
making process. The PI takes the ratio of the difference between the number of alternative-based
(horizontal) acquisition steps (NrALT) and the number of attribute-based acquisition steps
(NrATT) and the sum of these two types of information acquisition steps, all from the
MouselabWEB data (𝑃𝐼 = (𝑁𝑟𝐴𝐿𝑇 − 𝑁𝑟𝐴𝑇𝑇)/(𝑁𝑟𝐴𝐿𝑇 + 𝑁𝑟𝐴𝑇𝑇). A score of 1 represents a
completely alternative-based decision process (reflects a compensatory decision strategy), and a
score of -1 represents a completely attribute-based search (reflects a non-compensatory decision
strategy). Second, decision focus was measured by the proportion of time spent inspecting the
best three alternatives (i.e., those with the lowest total cost in the defined utility task), relative to
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total time looking at alternatives, with zero being no focus and 1 being total focus (in the
mediation analysis, we take the natural log of this value).
Figure 3 presents the average scores of the process variables by experimental condition.
We ran analyses of variance to test for the significance of these results with partitioning,
informed ordering, and their interaction as explanatory variables. Panel A shows the Payne
Index as our decision strategy measure. As hypothesized, partitioning leads to an increased use
of compensatory decision strategies, indicated by the relatively more positive means in the
figure. (H1; F(1, 1643) = 19.7, p < .001). In addition there is a much smaller unpredicted effect,
which is that informed ordering leads to a less compensatory decision process (F(1, 1643) = 4.5,
p < .05). Panel B shows the result for decision focus. As hypothesized, we find that informed
ordering strongly increases decision focus (H2; F(1, 1643) = 2390.6, p < .001). Also as
hypothesized, the interaction of partitioning and ordering was significant: partitioning leads to an
increase in decision focus (i.e., a greater ratio of time spent inspecting the best three options)
with informed ordering, but to a decrease in decision focus with naïve ordering (H3; F(1, 1643) =
1062.7, p < .001).

Results: Choice Outcomes
Next, we investigated the hypothesized combined effect of ordering and partitioning on
consumer choice (H4). We analyzed (1) the probability that a participant selected the best
alternative as a function of condition, and also the complementary dependent variable of (2) how
much each participant overpaid as a result of selecting a suboptimal product in each condition.
Both variables reflect deviations from the best insurance product specified by the decision rule
communicated to the participants (Johnson et al. 2013). Figure 4 (panel A) presents the accuracy
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of choice, using the percentage of consumers choosing the best product under each condition (the
upper bars in the figure) and the excess payment in dollars (the lower bars in the figure), both
averaged over the two choices per participant. Having an informed ordering positively impacts
on both measures, while partitioning clearly interacts with the kind of ordering, helping with
informed ordering and hurting with the naïve ordering. A random effects logistic model for the
choice of the best option confirmed these effects. The model analyzed if the best option was
chosen using the effects of ordering, partitioning, and their interaction. The results support the
hypothesized positive impact of partitioning with informed ordering, and that this impact
reverses with naïve ordering. A random effects regression model for the excess amount
participants paid also showed a strong significant interaction of ordering and partitioning in the
predicted direction (see Web Appendix B.1 for the detailed estimation results for both models).

Results: Mediation Analysis
Why do partitioning and informed ordering improve choices? To test the hypothesized
mediated moderation structure of decision strategy and decision focus on choice outcome (see
Figure 1), we conducted analyses using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS module in SPSS. We
analyzed as our key dependent variable whether or not participants had made the best choice.
Ordering (informed, naïve), partitioning (yes, no), and their interaction were the main
independent variables. The mediating process variables decision strategy (i.e., the Payne index)
and decision focus (i.e., relative time spent on best options) were also included, as was the
anticipated moderating effect of ordering on the effect of partitioning on decision focus. In the
model estimation, we used the data on the two observations per participant and included an order
variable as a covariate. The results of the analyses are presented in Table 1. Following the
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procedure outlined in Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010), the table first reports the unstandardized
coefficients for the different pathways in the model. These include the anticipated effects of
ordering and partitioning on the mediating variables decision strategy and focus. Consistent with
our prior analysis, we find support for H1, H2 and H3, the effects of the manipulations on the
hypothesized decision processes. We also find support for the anticipated effects of the two
decision processes on the dependent variable of choosing the best option.
Most importantly, the analysis allows us to look at the indirect effects of ordering and
partitioning on the decision outcome, via the two parallel mediating decision processes. In Table
1, these results are shown in the bottom part with the 95% confidence intervals from the
bootstrap analysis. If these confidence intervals are significantly different from zero, there is
support for the mediation hypothesis H5. First, we concentrate on the mediation of the effects
via of decision strategy. The results show that decision strategy indeed serves as a mediator of
the effect of partitioning on the choice of the best alternative (see the two rows for Indirect Effect
of Decision Strategy; p<.05). Next, we look at the mediation via decision focus. We find
decision focus is a significant mediator of the effect of partitioning on the dependent variable
(see the two rows for Indirect Effect of Decision Focus; p<.05). Finally, we find that the
moderating effect of informed ordering on partitioning is also mediated by decision focus as
hypothesized (see the row for Moderating Effect of Informed Ordering on Indirect Effect of
Decision Focus; p<.05). Jointly, these mediating effects provide strong support for H5.
- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE –

Discussion
The results of Study 1 provide outcome- as well as process-level support for the
hypothesized impact of ordering and partitioning on consumer choice in an incentive-compatible
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decision-making setting with objectively defined different utility levels between the different
choice outcomes. In terms of decision outcomes, the results strongly support H4. We find that
informed ordering is beneficial for consumers and that partitioning is also beneficial when
combined with informed ordering, but not when ordering is naïve. In terms of decision process,
the MouselabWEB data–based analysis allowed us to test H1 to H3 and H5. The results
supported our hypotheses and showed that the impact of ordering and partitioning on choice
outcomes is mediated by participants’ use of a more compensatory decision making process
(decision strategy) and their increased focus on the best alternatives (decision focus). These
findings show that partitioning combined with informed ordering based on a high-quality user
model (e.g., ordering based on the product’s overall attractiveness to the consumer) constitutes a
choice architecture ensemble that is beneficial for consumers. However, with a naïve ordering
(when user model quality is low), partitioning can harm consumers, particularly by shifting their
attention to less attractive options in the set.

Study 2: Field Study of a Health Insurance Choice Architecture Redesign

Study 1 showed that partitioning and ordering can improve choice in a framed field
experiment, but that does not ensure that similar results would occur in a real insurance
marketplace. In particular, we were concerned that actual buyers may not respond the same way
in a real-world environment and that the results may be limited to the artificial MouselabWEB
environment which is devoid of logos and may place restrictions on non-focal visual search.
Finally, perhaps the effects of partitioning may disappear if consumers make consequential
choices costing consumers significant money. Therefore, in Study 2 we analyzed field data from
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a leading financial product comparison website in the Netherlands. The website is similar in
many respects to HealthCare.gov in the United States and other health insurance exchange
websites (Wong et al. 2016). The firm serves as an intermediary between consumers and
suppliers of health insurance. Health insurance plans can be purchased directly through the
website and many consumers go to the site each year to switch insurance providers. The data we
obtained comes from a quasi-experiment involving a major interface redesign. The firm
introduced an informed ordering and partitioning intervention into their personalized health
insurance recommendation lists. By comparing consumer insurance choice data before and after
the interface redesign, we can examine the impact of this particular ordering and partitioning
intervention and see whether the results in a real-world environment are consistent with our
outcome-oriented hypothesis H4 that informed ordering and partitioning improve consumer
choice outcomes (Ericson and Starc 2012).

Data
Users of the website entered their personal characteristics and desired insurance
specifications, including whether they would like additional coverage above the legal minimum.
Based on this information, they were presented with an ordered list of recommended health
insurance alternatives. The original choice architecture was a full recommendation list of health
insurance products that met each consumer’s prespecified criteria, ordered from low to high
according to the premium (i.e., the plan’s purchase price) and displayed in groups of 10 to fit on
a webpage. After the redesign, the recommendation list was partitioned in two sections that
reflected an improved user model that reflect both price and quality. The first section presented
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the top three most highly recommended products, ordered according to the model (see Web
Appendix A.2 for before and after design). The firm introduced the new price–quality ordering
to more closely correspond to user preferences and better reflect consumer interests than the
prior ordering based only on price. In our terms, they improved their user model to produce a
more informed ordering reflecting the fact that consumers must make tradeoffs between these
attributes that are often negatively correlated. The redesign also introduced a partitioning:
Presenting a subset of the three plans highest ranked by the user model, but consumers could
choose to click through to inspect the full list of 10 health insurance products. 2 Thus, the
redesign corresponded to a move from a non-partitioned, more naïve ordering, to a partitioned,
more informed ordering.
Consumers were able to purchase the insurance directly via the recommendation website
for most products. For a subset of products, they had to visit the insurer’s website to make the
purchase. In the latter case, we were not able to observe whether a policy was purchased with
the insurance company or if they were only browsing. Therefore, we only analyzed visits in
which consumers made purchases directly through the recommendation website. This allowed
us to track the impact of changes in the website choice architecture on consumers’ actual market
choices.
We obtained data from November to December of two consecutive years, Year 1 (before
the website choice architecture redesign) and from November to December of Year 2 (after the
website choice architecture redesign). Almost all health insurance purchases are made in the

2

The consumers could choose to sort this full list based on a product criterion that they selected, with price-based
ordering being the default in the full list presentation. As an intermediate step, the consumers were automatically
shown the lowest price alternative if this was not already part of the top three price–quality ranking. This step
provided additional information in the recommended set to some consumers in the sample.
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Netherlands during these two months, because this is the open enrollment period set by law. In
the data, health insurance products were purchased on the website during a total of 8,519 visits in
Year 1 and during 35,113 visits in Year 2. The website introduced a significant marketing
campaign along with the redesign, likely attracting, along with the redesign, many more
consumers to the website than before the change. Because of privacy concerns, we were only
able to obtain consumers’ age for the two years as sociodemographic background variables. In
Year 1, the average age was 36.2 years, and in Year 2 it was 39.1 years. For both Year 1 and
Year 2, the data we obtained captured the first 10 alternatives presented in the recommendation
list. Very few consumers chose outside of the first 10 alternatives and, hence, no other
alternatives were stored by the website. In Year 1, the data represented the full first page of
recommended products, and in Year 2 the data covered the top three products first presented to
consumers and the subsequent page that they could click through, with the first 10 alternatives.
We also obtained the rank position of each alternative, as well as the user’s individual
characteristics and insurance specifications and, finally, the alternative that was purchased.

Results
Figure 5 provides an overview of the results from the field study. In Year 1 (no
partitioning, price-only ordering), we found that 47.6% of the visitors who bought health
insurance selected the first-ranked alternative. In Year 2 (partitioning, price-quality based
ordering), 60.8% of the visitors who bought health insurance selected the first-ranked alternative.
More remarkably, the share of the lowest-ranked options in positions 4-10 declined from 31.2%
to 12.8%, a decrease of 59% in relative market share, due, in part to the introduction of a soft
partition with only one click added.
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To test the impact of the introduction of the new choice architecture design on the rank of
the products that the consumer purchased between the years, we estimated an ordered probit
model. The ordered probit is most appropriate for this analysis because it takes into account the
fact that, although a higher-ranked position is superior to a lower-ranked one, we cannot observe
the metric distance in attractiveness between the ranks. It allows us to take into account the
rank-order information from all consumers. The results of the ordered probit analysis strongly
support the hypothesized positive combined effect of informed ordering and partitioning on
consumer choice outcomes. We find the new choice architecture design has a significant effect
in the expected direction (β = .67, p < .001). This effect shows that, after the introduction of the
new choice architecture, consumers were significantly more likely to choose a higher-ranked
alternative. As a robustness check, we also estimated the ordered probit model while controlling
for participants’ age. The effect of this control variable was significant (β=-.01; p=0.001)
indicating that overall, older consumers were less likely to choose a higher ranked alternative.
Adding this control variable to the model did not affect the significance of the other results.
- INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE -

Discussion
The results of the field study provide real-world validation of the possible changes in
choice that we predict when an informed order is combined with partitioning. We found that
consumers made different choices in the non-partitioned price-only based ordering setting
compared to the new choice architecture design and the results of the ordered probit model
estimates revealed a strong positive effect of introducing the new design. Of course, this study is
limited since there are a number of other factors that were not controlled when the intervention
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occurred, such as the presence of different customers, new policies, and policy characteristics, a
limitation we address with Study 3.

Study 3: Experimentally Controlled Lab Replication of the Field Study
Because the field data reflect real-world conditions, one potential confounding effect was
the fact that the website likely attracted a broader, less expert, consumer segment to the
redesigned website than before the change and it is unknown how that may have affected the
decisions we observed. Also, because the recommendations were personalized, we cannot rule
out the possibility that differences in the composition of recommendation lists could also have
affected the responses to the partitioned recommendations. Therefore, in Study 3, we replicated
the field study result in a simplified controlled online study that assigned respondents randomly
to treatment conditions and presented the same set of alternatives to all respondents.

Method
The participants were randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions in a 2
(ordering: informed vs. uninformed) x 2 (partitioning: yes vs. no) between-subjects experimental
design. In all conditions, participants were presented with a recommendation list of 10 health
insurance plans (see Web Appendix A.3). The plans were ordered on one of two measures of
attractiveness: a more informed comprehensive measure that combined both price and quality
based on the firm’s expert evaluations (ordered from the most to the least attractive price–quality
score as was done in the field study), and a naïve ordering based on price only (ordered from the
most to the least attractive price). We also varied whether or not the set was partitioned: The
partitioned condition showed participants the three most highly recommended products, with the
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option to click through to the full list (ranked on the same ordering criterion). The full
recommendation list condition showed the ordered list of all recommended products directly to
the participants without partitioning. The products were described in terms of the key health
insurance product features used on the health insurance comparison website from which we
obtained our field data. The participants could click on a help link to see a short explanation of
each feature. Although the presence of partitioning and the order of presentation varied, the
participants had access to the exact same set of products and explanations under all conditions;
therefore, any changes in observed choices must be due to the manipulated factors.
The participants were asked to make a choice from the health insurance plans presented
as if they had to select a health insurance plan for themselves. The plans on the recommendation
list closely reflected a realistic product selection in the participants’ health insurance market (the
Netherlands) for adults. The actual plans and price–quality ordering were taken from the website
from which we obtained the field data for Study 2. The brand names were changed to fictitious
ones to avoid unobserved brand associations that the participants could have. The only minor
modifications made were to avoid the presence of clearly dominating alternatives in the list. For
this study, a total of 858 participants over the age of 18 were recruited through a large-scale
online panel run by a marketing research company. The average age of the participants was 46.7
years old, 50.9% of them were female, 36.9% had a bachelor’s or higher degree, and 38.7% had
bought health insurance for themselves or someone else in their household within the past two
years.
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Results
To determine the significance of the observed differences in the ranks chosen between
the conditions, we used an ordered probit model, as in the field study, to analyze the effects of a
naïve ordering (based on price-only) versus an informed ordering ( based on price and quality),
partitioning, and the interaction between these two factors The results of the analysis strongly
support the results of the field study. We find that informed ordering and partitioning made
consumers more likely to choose higher ranked options, with significant positive effects of
informed ordering (β = .80, p < .001) and partitioning (β = 1.83, p < .001) as expected. We find
no significant interaction of informed ordering and partitioning (β = .12, p = .33). As a
robustness check, we also estimated the ordered probit model while controlling for the
participants’ experience with buying health insurance in the past two years (yes/no). The effect
of this control variable was not significant, and adding it to the model did not affect the
significance of the other results.

Discussion
The results of this study replicated that informed ordering and partitioning improve health
care plan choices. Unlike Study 2, which used a quasi-experimental design that limits inferences
of causality, Study 3 demonstrated in a controlled experiment that informed ordering and
partitioning cause improvements in choices between health care plans. In contrast to Study 1, we
do not find a significant interaction between ordering and partitioning. This can perhaps be
explained by the fact that a price-based ordering is still informative to consumers which may
have attenuated the negative impact of the naïve ordering condition. We investigate the effect of
a partially informed ordering on consumer choice outcomes in Study 4.
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Study 4: Partitioning Improves Consumer Choice Outcomes under
Moderately Informed Ordering as Well

Study 4 extends our work to a setting with a more realistic, partially informed ordering.
This allows us to assess the impact of ordering and partitioning under more realistic conditions
where the firm might have a moderately noisy ordering of options that would arise from an
imperfect, but informative user model. We used the same Dutch-language website as the basis
for the experiment, introducing an additional third, moderately informed ordering. As in Study
1, the experiment employed a defined utility task that instructed participants which tradeoff to
optimize in selecting an alternative from the set, but without incentives. This again allowed us to
define an objectively best option in the choice task.

Method
The participants were randomly assigned to one of the six treatment conditions of a 3
(ordering: informed, partially informed, naïve) x 2 (partitioning: yes vs. no) between-subjects
experimental design. In all conditions, participants were presented with a list of the same 10
health insurance plans. The participants responded to a defined utility task in which they were
asked to choose from the health insurance plans presented to them as if they were choosing a
plan on behalf of a person they knew well but who was not part of their own household (e.g., an
elderly aunt or uncle). They were told that this person desired a minimum (well-defined) level of
coverage and, otherwise, to choose the best buy. The best buy was defined for them as the
highest ratio of the monthly premium paid and the review ratings that customers gave the
insurance provider. Since they were based on the real-world website in Study 2, the plans reflect
a realistic product set in the participants’ health insurance market (the Netherlands). We
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changed the brand names to be fictitious and participants could click on a help link to see a short
explanation of each attribute.
Under the informed ordering condition, alternatives were ordered to be almost perfectly
aligned with the predefined decision criterion. The only deviation was that the third and fourth
alternatives in the ranking were reversed. The partially informed ordering reversed the position
of the first and third alternatives. This condition examined if a top-three partitioning could help
increase consumers’ ability to select the best alternative, even when the ordering was noisy. The
naïve ordering condition randomized the options, with two constraints: first, the third-ranked
alternative was kept identical to that in the informed ordering condition, allowing us to more
clearly compare the consumer choices between the three conditions. Second, the most attractive
alternative was fifth, so that the participants would have to search beyond the partitioning to find
the best alternative in the list.
We used two partitioning conditions, a non-partitioned condition and a partitioned
condition presenting the first three recommended products with a prominent button allowing
them to click through to the full list. The full list condition showed the ordered set of all the
recommended products directly to the participants. This structure was the same as in Study 3
(see Web Appendix A.3).
Participants over the age of 18 were recruited through a large-scale online panel run by a
marketing research company in the Netherlands. A total of 1,577 valid responses were obtained.
The average age of the participants in the sample was 45.5 years old, 51.1% of the, were female,
42.2% had obtained a bachelor’s or higher degree, and 45.3% had bought health insurance for
themselves or for someone else in their household in the past two years.
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Results
As in Study 1, we tested the effect of ordering and partitioning using as a dependent
variable whether or not participants selected the objectively best product in each condition, and a
second, complementary dependent variable, how much a participant overpaid compared to the
best insurance product by selecting a suboptimal alternative. 3 Both dependent measures show a
similar pattern, seen in Figure 4, panel B. The partially informed ordering is less effective than
the fully informed ordering, but much closer to the informed than to the naïve ordering. Most
importantly, the effect of ordering interacts with partitioning: Partitioning helps with informed
or partially informed ordering but hurts for a naïve ordering. Many participants selected the best
alternative in the partially informed ordering condition (though fewer than in the informed
condition) and partitioning helped with both fully informed and partially informed orders. The
figure shows that the informed and intermediate ordering clearly made a difference, with a naïve
ordering producing worse performance in both outcome measures
We tested this pattern using a logistic regression analysis that modeled the probability of
participants’ selection of the best product, using the effects of ordering, partitioning, and their
interaction. The ordering was represented as an indicator variable, with naïve ordering being the
base level. Partitioning was also represented as an indicator variable, with non-partitioning as
the base level. The results confirm the impression given by the figure and our hypotheses. We
find a positive effect of informed ordering but not partial ordering in the non-partitioned
condition (βINFORMED = .44, p = .01; βPARTIAL = .10, n.s.). There is a negative effect of partitioning

3

We obtained this measure by first calculating the ratio of the monthly premium and the customer review rating for
each product (in accordance with the participants’ task). Using this ratio, we calculated a virtual yearly price for
each consumers’ selected product at the consumer review score of the best available product. The difference
between this virtual price and the actual price for the best available product was the amount a consumer overpaid.
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in the naïve ordering condition (βPARTITION = -2.67, p < .001), but this is more than compensated
for in the informed and partially informed conditions by the large and significant interaction
effect (βINFORMED*PARTITION = 2.94, p < .001; βPARTIAL*PARTITION = 3.05, p < .001). Jointly, these
results provides strong support for H4, and show that in the partially informed condition there is
also a positive effect of partitioning, in line with what we observed in Study 3. We also ran an
analysis controlling for participants’ experience with buying health insurance in the past two
years (yes/no). While prior experience helped (β = .24, p = .03), it did not affect the significance
of the other results.
Testing the amount overpaid showed a similar pattern of significance. An analysis of
variance looking at the three levels of ordering and the two partitioning levels and their
interactions strongly support the hypothesized effects. There is a strong significant effect of
ordering in the predicted direction (F(2, 1571) = 69.7, p < .001), with lower losses in the case of
higher user model quality. We find an negative effect of partitioning (F(1, 1571) = 6.6,
p = .01), which is compensated for by the hypothesized large interaction effect of ordering and
partitioning (F(2, 1571) = 44.2; p < .001). This interaction reflects the detrimental effect of
partitioning in the naïve ordering condition, which, in the main effect, dominates the positive
impact of ordering in the informed and partially informed conditions. Additional analysis of the
simple effects of partitioning within each ordering condition reveals the significance of these
contrasting effects per condition and in the expected direction. As hypothesized, we find that the
impact of partitioning is significantly positive in the informed and partially informed ordering
conditions (p = .03 and p = .02, respectively), but significantly negative in the naïve ordering
condition (p < .001). Again, we also conducted analysis of variance while controlling for
participants’ experience with buying health insurance. The effect of this control variable was not
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significant and adding it to the model did not affect the significance of the other results.

Discussion
The results of Study 4 provide further support for the hypothesized moderating effect of
ordering on the impact of partitioning on consumer choice outcomes in a normative setting with
objectively different quality levels between different choice outcomes. The outcome of our
analyses strongly support the hypothesized effects of ordering and partitioning on consumer
choice outcomes. We find that, with informed and partially informed ordering, partitioning is
beneficial for consumers, but with naïve ordering, partitioning is not beneficial and can even be
harmful to consumer choice outcomes.

General Discussion
The results from all four studies show that as we hypothesized, ordering and partitioning
have a significant and beneficial impact on consumer choice outcomes, but that these effects
depend upon having a good user model. Consumers are more likely to choose the best
alternative when presented with a set that is ordered according to overall product attractiveness
and partitioned into a small recommended set with the possibility of clicking through to see the
full set. We show that this is because the partition encourages the use of a compensatory
decision strategy and when combined with an informed ordering, focuses consumer attention on
a small set of high quality options.
Since we are interested in improving the choice of health care policies, we can look at the
performance of the incentivized decision-maker in Study 1. In that study, consumers made
mistakes in excess of $865 dollars when presented with the least effective choice architecture.
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Having an informed order reduced that error to about $295, but adding a partition to that
ordering reduced errors to just over $122, a savings of about $743 per decision-maker. While
these figures are specific to this study, they are similar to the size of errors reported in earlier
framed-field experiments (Johnson et al. 2013) and field studies (Bhargava et al. 2017). Given
that there are slightly over 200 million people covered by private plans and 100 million by
government plans, many of which involve choice, the stakes of getting the choice architecture
right could be measured in billions, if not trillions of dollars in the U.S. alone.

Theoretical Implications
In addition to our proposition that decision focus and strategy selection are important
mediators of choice architecture effects, we contribute two additional, broader theoretical
considerations. First, our research makes explicit a notion long implicit in the choice
architecture literature: the idea of a user model. If choice architects have a high-quality user
model, they can intervene more effectively, since they can identify what is the correct option for
each decision maker. While we talk about this impact in terms of ordering and partition, it is
also relevant in other choice architecture interventions such as defaults (Johnson and Goldstein
2003).
Second, our study suggests that the effects of choice architecture tools depend on the
context and presence of other choice architecture tools. In the present studies, partitioning and
ordering did not simply have additive effects, but rather interactive effects. In fact, partitioning
had a positive impact on choices when options were ordered in an informed fashion, but a
negative impact when options were naively ordered. This suggests that choice architecture tools
should be evaluated as ensembles and consumers could react differently to ensembles than to
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each tool individually. Contemporary websites often allow the user to employ multiple tools.
Airline sites allow consumers to screen their options (e.g., by time, airline), a specific case of
partitioning, and provide ordering options (e.g., by fare). Our notion of ensembles suggests that,
although each could usually be helpful, there are conditions under which they can lead to worse
choice outcomes, particularly when one is applied with a poor implementation of the other.
Obviously, both of these implications merit further inquiry.

Future Research
Ordering and partitioning, their interaction, and the idea of user models all raise
important questions for future research and application. Obviously, the idea of developing
algorithms and models to make recommendations is a growing and vibrant area of consumer
research (Chintagunta et al. 2016). We hope that such models not only produce better quality
predictions but are increasingly able to model the heterogeneity in consumer preferences. Such
heterogeneity in preferences has been a challenge for the use of choice architecture. Defaults,
for example, have usually been applied as a ‘one size fits all’ framework. Yet it is possible to
customize choice architecture, say through the use of customized ‘smart defaults’ to embrace
such heterogeneity (Goldstein et al. 2008).
An important question is how to improve decisions when user models make weak
predictions. One idea would be to adjust the characteristics of the presentation to reflect
uncertainty in what people want. Partitioning offers a good example. If the firm is very certain
of the quality of its user model, then the partitioned set can be quite small. With greater
uncertainty, the size of the partitioned set can increase until, at the extreme, there would be no
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partitioning at all. There is, therefore, no “one size fits all,” optimal partitioning size; rather,
there are different optimal sizes for different markets and different firm modelling capabilities.

Managerial and Policy Implications
We close by discussing the tension we mentioned in the opening of the article, potentially
between the interests of consumers and the profit-maximizing interests of firms. We began by
suggesting that there are situations where firms may know what is in the best interest of
consumers and can prevent them from making mistakes. We have examined one domain,
namely health insurance, where that is arguably true. Firms may have, for example, a more
accurate idea of someone’s risks than the individual him- or herself because dangerous health
events are both rare and potentially catastrophic. We doubt that the average purchaser has an
accurate view of the probability and cost of an auto accident or of contracting a serious disease
when making a health insurance purchase.
Firms may, in the short term, exploit these informational asymmetries, but the current
work suggests another path, to build choice architectures that will help consumers make better
decisions. The success of this strategy may depend upon the ability of firms to convince people
that there is value in following their recommendations, and this is likely to be a long-term
proposition. However, there are examples where firms have seemed to take this approach. In
investments, Betterment, a so-called robo-advisor, has prospered increasing assets under
management to $16 billion dollars since its founding in 2010. A major value proposition has
been delivering a solution to “bad” behavior by consumers, for example improving their
decisions by prioritizing the display of long-term returns to consumers and by explaining to them
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why they should not sell in short term markets. Other solutions are automated investment
strategies, such as rebalancing portfolios automatically.

Conclusion
In close, it is worth noting that there are two factors that may affect our view of the
marketing function in relation to choice architecture. The first is the advent of a deeper
understanding of the errors that can be made by consumers. While some deviations from
rationality may be defensible, others, such as paying too much for a dominated health insurance
policy, or not investing properly for retirement, are harder to rationalize, and are probably
significant mistakes that have negative financial and welfare effects. The second is that given
the advent of big data, firms may be better able to suggest choices that lead consumers to more
satisfying outcomes than consumers themselves are. Together, these factors suggest a marketing
opportunity that is not apparent in models that posit a more rational, fully informed decisionmaker. Choice architecture, wisely applied, can be a relatively inexpensive and efficient way to
use this knowledge to improve social welfare. Both better prediction of consumer choices and
choice architecture could be used to increase short term profit. For example, an insurer who
observes their consumers paying too much for a dominated policy might be pleased with the
increased revenue. However, we hope that firms use this knowledge to develop new business
models that deliver longer term value to both consumers and their stockholders.
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Table 1
Study 1: Mediation Analysis for Best Choice§
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients of the Model Pathways
Partitioning on Decision Strategy (H1)
Informed Ordering on Decision Strategy

Parameter
estimate
.04**

t-value
4.44

-.02**

-2.13

.01

.58

-1.41**

-24.94

Informed Ordering on Decision Focus (H2)

1.82**

32.22

Interaction of Informed Ordering and Partitioning on Decision Focus (H3)

1.66**

29.24

Decision Strategy on Choice of Best Alternative

.82**

4.96

Decision Focus on Choice of Best Alternative

.69**

7.70

.02

.37

Informed Ordering on Choice of Best Alternative

-.14

-1.86

Interaction of Informed Ordering and Partitioning on Choice of Best
Alternative

-.07

-1.11

Effect

S.E.

.03*

.01

LL= .01

UL=.06

.04*

.01

LL= .02

UL=.07

-2.10*

.20

LL=-2.54

UL=-1.78

.17*

.02

LL= .13

UL=.21

.01

.02

LL= -.02

UL=.04

2.27*

.21

LL= 1.92

UL=2.73

Interaction of Informed Ordering and Partitioning on Decision Strategy
Partitioning on Decision Focus

Partitioning on Choice of Best Alternative

Bootstrap Tests of Indirect (Mediated Moderation) Effects (H5)
Indirect Effect of Decision Strategy (Naïve Ordering)
5,000 bootstraps C.I. at 95%
Indirect Effect of Decision Strategy (Informed Ordering)
5,000 bootstraps C.I. at 95%
Indirect Effect of Decision Focus (Naïve Ordering)
5,000 bootstraps C.I. at 95%
Indirect Effect of Decision Focus (Informed Ordering)
5,000 bootstraps C.I. at 95%
Moderating Effect of Informed Ordering on Indirect Effect of Decision
Strategy
5,000 Bootstraps C.I. at 95%
Moderating Effect of Informed Ordering on Indirect Effect of Decision
Focus
5,000 bootstraps C.I. at 95%
§

We also include a choice task order variable in the model that captures the average difference between the first and second sets of
choices for each respondent. For expositional clarity, this variable is not tabulated. While the PROCESS module we used for
estimation does not allow for random effects, we also ran the analysis for only the first choice for each participant and obtained
similar findings. In this table, n = 828 (with two choice tasks observed for most but not all respondents). The superscripts ** and *,
respectively, denote significance at p < .01 and p < .05.
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Figure 1
Hypothesized Mediated Moderation Structure£

£ The moderating effect of informed ordering on the relationship between partitioning and decision focus is
indicated by an arrow impacting the path from partitioning to decision focus. Informed ordering results in
a positive effect of partitioning on decision focus and choice of the best alternative. However, naïve
ordering reverses the effect of partitioning and leads to lower decision focus and lower decision quality.
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Figure 2
Study 1: Process Data MouselabWEB
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Figure 3
Study 1: Decision Process Measures£
Panel A - Decision strategy:
Payne Index§

Panel B – Decision focus:
Ratio of time spent on best three options

£ Lines in bars represent standard errors.
§ For the Payne Index, higher (less negative) scores imply a more compensatory decision process.
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Figure 4
Percentage of Accurate Consumer Choices and
Yearly Amount Overpaid Due to Not Choosing the Best Product£
Panel A - (Study 1)

Panel B - (Study 4)

£ Lines in bars represent standard errors.
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Figure 5
Field Study: Consumer Choices Before and After the Introduction of
Informed Ordering and Partitioning
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